In the framework of the Summit of NATO Aspirant Countries “Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague”, which took place in Riga on July 5–6 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) organised a public discussion with an emphasis on NGO and academic participation. While the Prime Ministers discussed “how to cross the bridge to Prague” during the formal Sessions of the Summit, the more academic NGO discussion focused on the issues that will come up for the Alliance and its new members after the Prague summit:

• What are the changes in threat perception within NATO?
• What missions should NATO focus on?
• What new capabilities are required and who can deliver them?
• What is the substance of transatlantic relationship in the 21st Century?
• How do NATO’s new relationships support its missions?
• What are the roles and responsibilities of new members on the Alliance’s frontiers?

The discussion was moderated by Dr. Ronald Asmus, Senior Fellow of the US Council on Foreign Relations, who together with the participants of the panel - Mr. Marcus Meckel, Vice President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Member of Bundestag, Mrs. Alyson Bailes, Head of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Mr. Janis Kukainis, President of the World Federation of Free Latvians, Prof. Francois Heisbourg, Head of Foundation for Strategic Research (France), Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Aivars Stranga, University of Latvia, Mr. Carl Bildt, former Swedish Prime Minister, Dr. Gustavo Selva, Member of Italian Parliament, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee – made the essential and invaluable contribution to the discussion by sharing their views and positions on NATO. In addition, the involvement of the participants of the audience offered an interesting and valuable exchange of their visions on the topic.

This book offers a possibility for a wider audience not being able to participate in the NGO forum to find the answers to the questions addressed at the discussion.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATA – Atlantic Treaty Association
CE – Central-European
CESDP – Central-European Security and Defence Policy
CFE Treaty – Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CINCCOM – Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command
CINCPAC – Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
EU – European Union
EUCOM – European Commander
GDR – German Democratic Republic
IFOR – Implementation Force for Bosnia and Herzegovina
KFOR – Kosovo Force
LATO – Latvian Transatlantic Organisation
MAP – Membership Action Plan
NAC – North Atlantic Council
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO – Non-Governmental organisation
NORDCAPS – Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIP – Partnership for Peace
SFOR – Stabilisation Force for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN – United Nations
US – United States of America
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

NGO FORUM “POST-PRAGUE VISION OF THE ENLARGED NATO: MISSIONS, RELATIONSHIPS AND CHALLENGES”

Moderator:
Dr. Ronald Asmus, Senior Fellow of the US Council on Foreign Relations, the USA

Panellists:
Mrs. Alyson Bailes, Head of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the UK
Mr. Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden
Prof. Bronislav Geremek, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland
Prof. Francois Heisbourg, Head of Foundation for Strategic Research, France
Mr. Janis Kukainis, President of the World Federation of Free Latvians, the USA
Mr. Markus Meckel, Vice President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Member of Bundestag, Germany
Dr. Gustavo Selva, Member of Parliament and Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee, Italy
Prof. Aivars Stranga, University of Latvia

Contributors to the Discussion:
Mr. Pier Carlson, Director of the Danish Foreign Affairs Institute
Mr. Janis Kazocins, British Army Officer
Mr. Grigorijs Krupnikovs, Co-Chairman of the Latvian Jewish Community
Mr. Igor Leshukov, Director of the Institute of International Affairs, St. Petersburg, Russia
Mr. George Schwab, President of the USA National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. Kalev Stoicescu, Chairman of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Estonia
INTRODUCTION BY THE MODERATOR DR. RONALD ASMUS

Good morning! I would like to greet you with this morning’s NGO forum entitled “Post-Prague Visions of the Enlarged NATO – Missions, Relationships and Challenges” and to think that today’s forum and the representatives we have up here are a testimony both to the fact that there is life after government, and to the role that NGO’s have played in the entire debate. And I think it is fair to say that if we think about the Vilnius process, the Baltic States, that NGO’s have played a very important role in the success and in the accomplishments that we are witnessing at today’s summit.

Each of our speakers will speak for about 5 minutes. I will be a firm but not too hegemonic chairman here, to keep us on track and moving forward.

MARCUS MECKEL, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY AND MEMBER OF THE BUNDESTAG

Ladies and gentlemen! Thank you very much for inviting me. I am very happy to be here again. I think it is my fifth time in Riga; the first time was in March 1991, when you had the referendum about independence. And I think if we see the way you have gone in these years, then it is really marvellous. And I think it is very important that we are here together a short time before the NATO states will invite you, and I am really sure that you and the other Baltic States together, I think, in the end with four others, will be invited in November. This will be a very important step for stabilisation of Europe.

I can say it as a German who grew up in the eastern part of Germany, and we as former GDR became a member of NATO and the EU with the unification of Germany. This was a very marvellous step for us, and it includes for us a responsibility to work for the integration of our partners who were not only dominated but suppressed by the Soviet Union in the Eastern block of Europe in former times, and which had at the same time the liberation by revolutions, by democratic revolutions and changes, and I think we have had to work for the integration of these new democracies, which are not new today – it is a long time, it is more than ten years, - for the integration of these countries into the EU and in NATO. And I think, especially this year is a very important one because at the end of this year we will have the invitation, I think, it will be seven countries, and this will stabilise Europe if all these countries belong to NATO.

On the other hand, for the societies, it is more important that you will at the end finish your negotiations with the EU and during the next two years will be the member of the EU, too. So both institutions, both the most important institutions, NATO and the EU, will be enlarged in a big manner. And I think this will stabilise Europe and will give another picture not only for Europe but I think also for the world. And it will be the ground, it will be the basis for facing the new challenges we have to do within the new world, and not only after the attacks of terrorists, which were attacks not only against Americans but against freedom, against the civilised world. We have a new challenge, a global challenge. And we have to see in which way we together can fight in a global way against terrorism. This is a challenge for NATO, but not only for NATO.

If we see what has to be done, many of these tasks are not military; it is not only military instruments we need. We all know, Germany during the last ten years had to learn it that we need military instruments, too, and we have to be ready to do it. But it is only at the end; there are many other things to do, and NATO has no instruments for that; the question of police, the question of organised crime, and all such things. We need instruments for that, and we need more than only NATO instruments for the transatlantic linkage. And so it is first a European question, and we, as Europeans have to be clear what Europe it will be, and what we are ready to do for the integration of Europe. We are developing, during the last years, ESDP, and the common foreign policy. But we are only at the beginning, and we have to do more for that; there has to be a clear voice of Europe in the world, and only a clear voice of Europe will give the transatlantic dialogue a clear and new harmony. That is why, I think, we at first for the new NATO have the challenge of European voice. We see that for the future this will not be easy. Today we have some problems with the question of International Criminal Court. And you know that it is not the only issue besides the question of peace. If we see the difficulties in these days when we have to continue the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia of the United Nations, then we see that such differences between Europe and the United States will have consequences. So I think we have to raise these questions for the future, and we have to find instruments for communication. Because I think these values we often have in our speeches are important, and the main point for that is the dominion of law. And the question is: which
law is it? What importance has the international law and in which way we are ready to strengthen it? Because I am really convinced that only when we are ready to strengthen the international law, we will have instruments to fight for peace and to fight against terrorism and other enemies of peace. Thank you very much!

ALYSON BAILES, HEAD OF STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

I am very honoured to make my first statement as Director of SIPRI here among my Latvian friends and other good friends. I want to speak about NATO enlargement and the cause of peace. Since I have a written text, I will just touch on its main points.

I believe NATO always has been an organisation for peace through its effect in deterrence and détente. Today, as we know, it contributes also effectively to peacemaking, peacekeeping operations, and, of course, it keeps peace among its own members, which is not the least important. There has been some discussion of the impact of enlargement on peace and stability. Most people have focused on the impact on strategic relations with Russia, where I hope we can now give a quite hopeful answer. People have also noted that the new members will bring extra force and variety to NATO’s peacekeeping capacities, although, since they have already been able to collaborate so closely through Partnership for Peace, I do not think we should expect any radical changes there. And some scholars have also done a good work, looking at the impact of the preparations for accession on defence reform and modernization within the candidate countries, which, we should not forget, is a force for internal peace and stability, as well as an important contribution to the states’ peaceful behaviour to their neighbours.

I want to touch here on three aspects less mentioned but which I think are interesting. The first one is that all the new applicant states are involved in various regional networks from the Baltic to the Black Sea. These are not explicitly security organisations but they do look at many new threats like pollution, accidents, control of migration and borders. And I think NATO has given quite clear signals that it does not oppose those organisations, it would like them to continue, and indeed, it would be only too happy that after the enlargement there was no harsh security dividing line between the new members and their next neighbours with which they certainly share regional security interests. We do indeed share global security interests with the new members outside NATO, and I know that some new initiatives are going on, particularly in the EAPC, to find new topics of collaboration across the new NATO frontier, and particularly those related to the global fight against terrorism.

There is another group of countries, the non-allied countries, which have made quite clear that they intend to go on collaborating with NATO across the changing dividing lines. And we see initiatives like the NORDCAPS peacekeeping force in Northern Europe, which makes quite clear that even states, which are not applicants, want to play an active part.

But my second point is that NATO, and indeed, the EU (because it is good to look at these together) has quite a lot of policies on arms control and disarmament in a more traditional sense, and no one has suggested that the new members will be excluded from those policies. In the case of NATO, if we can succeed in bringing the CFE Treaty into force, there will be the question of whether there should be new members joining that treaty, there will also be questions of whether there should be any unilateral confidence building measures or agreed confidence building measures along NATO’s new frontiers. Russia is obviously interested in those questions. And although NATO has rejected any linkage with enlargement, it has agreed in the new process at Twenty to continue active dialogue with Russia on arms control, including European and local measures, so it will be interesting to see what happens there.

And I would just add, since many of the same states will be joining the EU, that they will also join important arms control commitments there, such as the EU’s code of conduct on conventional arms exports, and the EU’s regulations on dual-use goods. And many of the same countries have joined or are preparing to join specialised export control groups which work for peace, like the Australian group, MTCR, and so on. I mention this point because those kinds of regimes make demands inside a country; you have to have very good customs control measures, you have to have good collaboration with private industry, it is a heavy burden of change. And I am asking myself whether the
EU is actually doing enough to advise its new members on the kind of changes they need to make, and indeed, to introduce some kind of policy control and monitoring to ensure that there is obligations of net.

My last point is that both the EU and NATO in effect have a collective existence out in the world and in other institutions; there is a formal EU group, which takes common positions, for example, in the OSCE. NATO and the EU both discuss within themselves what lines to take on certain relevant arms control questions coming up in New York and Geneva. The new members are going to considerably expand those EU and NATO groups; I do not call them caucuses because that is sometimes understood negatively. This is obviously a very positive development; it offers a very good scope for further western leadership in the process of arms control. But it will also be necessary to make sure that these larger groups do not then fall victim to splits within themselves that they do not alienate other partners who may wish to be on the same line on many arms control and disarmament topics of which Russia is an important one. And there is, I think, some risk that other groups, for example, from the developing world, may see a phenomenon of developed countries gaining up against them on arms control and security questions. If we think about this in good time, I think we can avoid those negative effects and exploit positive ones.

Any representatives from applicant states who have not already thought about these issues, may now be saying, “Oh, my God, here is another set of complications and obligations we have to deal with”. I am afraid the fact is that every group of countries joining NATO has to pay more than the previous group because NATO itself is expanding its responsibilities and its competence. At least once you are full members you can decide for yourself how these burdens should be developed further and balanced in future. I hope NATO will keep a balance between its positive military action for peace and the contributions it makes through control, through restraint, through support for disarmament processes. And I wish all the best to the new members who will be helping to maintain those very fine traditions. Thank you!

OUTLINE OF THE INTERVENTION BY THE DIRECTOR OF SIPRI
ALYSON J.K. BAILES
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE

1. NATO has always and rightly claimed to be a force for peace—through its double role of deterrence and détente—but also through the disciplining and normative influence it exerts over its own members. In the post-Cold War decade it also rapidly assumed a new role as a source of military capacities for peace-keeping and peace enforcement in the modern sense.

2. In considering the impact of the present enlargement on peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, attention has so far focussed on two aspects: Russia’s role and reactions, and the extent to which NATO can help create and mobilise new capabilities for peace interventions among the new member States. The first question has hopefully now been answered in a very positive way. The second is important, but one should not expect a quantum leap here, not least because the likely new entrants have already worked so closely with NATO in PIP/EAPC. (Important support for NATO peacekeeping will also continue to be given by non-member States, e.g. the European non-Allies.)

3. We should therefore perhaps spare attention for some aspects not widely discussed up to now, but which are very much part of the traditional repertoire of peace studies. One very important issue concerns the democratization and reform of defence practice and policy, which has been a main object of the pre-accession process for NATO applicants but will not cease to have a stabilizing and peace-building impact after their accession. However, a couple of very good research studies have already been done on this. I will therefore focus here on three other points which have been even less debated.

4. The first is, what impact will the enlarged NATO (and enlarged EU covering probably much the same geographical area) have on various ‘soft’ or ‘indirect’ security processes going on up to now in Europe’s regions? These include bilateral/trilateral cross-border relationships such as collaborative frontier management and joint peacekeeping forces; sub-regional organisations, e.g. in the Black Sea, Baltic and High North areas which include various degrees of cooperation against ‘new threats’ (such as pollution and natural and man-made disasters) and transparency and confidence-building measures; various Mediterranean security networks including NATO’s own Mediterranean policies and the EU’s Euro-Med process; and at least one major post-crisis stabilization/normalization regime in the shape of the EU’s Balkan Stability Pact.

5. The message that seems to be coming across clearly from NATO so far is that these “inclusive” security activities can and should continue, including—or perhaps specially—where they involve States not covered in the present enlargement process. They can all help to ensure that NATO’s new boundaries do not represent harmful dividing lines, or mark a sharp drop-off in terms of everyday security experience. At the same time, NATO is discussing various new initiatives, notably in the EAPC context, which would strengthen future security cooperation with non-members in some cases on a region-by-region basis, in others by extending systematic cooperation in new dimensions such as anti-terrorism and stopping the spread of WMD. Meanwhile, non-applicant States such as the Nordics have made very clear that they want to remain part of the wider potential peace-keeping pool under NATO’s leadership, and will indeed take further steps to harmonize and coordinate their contributions (vide NORDCAPS). The EU has perhaps gone less far in thinking through and declaring its policy on the corresponding issues: though it
already has mechanisms for associating non-member States to the activities of CESDP, and has brought certain security topics into the EU/Russian dialogue.

6. My second point is about formal arms control and disarmament processes. Both NATO and the EU have many common positions and obligations in this field as part of their “acquis”. I have heard nothing so far to suggest that new member states will be, or want to be, excluded from full participation in these policies. In NATO’s case there are issues to consider about possible further accessions to the CFE Treaty, assuming the efforts to bring the treaty into force are successful: also the possibility of voluntary restrictions on force deployments and activities, and/or new confidence-building measures along the Alliance’s new borders. Russia has of course expressed a special interest in these implications and I note that in the context of the new NATO-Russia Council—though not in any linkage with enlargement as such—the Allies and Russia have committed themselves to various continued efforts for arms control, confidence-building and military cooperation. If, as I suspect, the general result is to thicken up the web of arms control commitments in Northern and Eastern Europe, it is possible that new questions and challenges will arise also for non-Alled States who have so far been less engaged. At a more general and theoretical level, NATO’s expansion could—or at least should—have the effect of a nuclear non-proliferation measure because it brings more States under a nuclear umbrella without their having to possess weapons of their own. It might revive the debate which has been quiet for some years over the necessity and the control of shorter-range nuclear weapons in the European theatre.

7. These changes, essentially very positive, in the European arms control scene are accentuated when one considers the EU common positions which many of the same States will have to adopt, such as the Regulation on export control for dual-use goods and the Code of Conduct on conventional arms exports. All CE applicant States have fully associated themselves from outside with specific EU common positions and joint actions in this area. Many although not all of the CE States have also entered or are preparing to enter the various free-standing export control regimes which, though potentially global in membership, are considered part of the heritage of responsible European nations—MTCR, the Australia group and so forth. It is worth noting that these types of regimes make particularly strong demands on the internal organization of signatory States, requiring measures that affect the private as well as public sectors. It would be interesting to know what steps the applicants are taking to coordinate the necessary measures, and develop any necessary new competencies and institutions. Perhaps the EU itself could offer clearer practical guidelines in future, and develop some measures for quality control and collaboration in enforcement?

8. Finally, it seems to me that the expansion of both of Europe’s leading integrated organizations will have significant effects on the dynamics of larger institutions where disarmament, peace- and security-building—and one should now add, measures to combat terrorism—are discussed. The EU acts as an organized group for certain purposes in several such bodies such as the OSCE. Both the NATO and EU groups of nations aim to coordinate their positions on relevant disarmament issues coming up at the UN. Even where such formal groupings do not exist, the “Western” caucus is going to look much larger and more united at such fora in general political terms. This again should be a positive development giving many new opportunities for constructive leadership. But there are also diplomatic challenges involved which perhaps it is not too early to be thinking about even now:
- can such large caucuses effectively be held together?
- will it become easier or harder to keep the US and the Europeans on the same line?
- how will Russia (and other Newly Independent States) relate to the enlarged Euro-Atlantic group in these fora?
- is there a risk of counter-reactions and hardening of lines within the corresponding non-European caucuses?

9. Any applicant States which have not already prepared a strategy and set aside resources for dealing with these new areas of obligation may well find the prospect rather daunting. The tough reality is that as NATO evolves and grows—and the same is true of the EU—the burdens laid upon each generation of new members are growing accordingly. Being a member at least offers a direct say in how the burdens should be handled and balanced for the Alliance as a whole in future. My own hope is that NATO will indeed find a balance between its positive actions for peace-building, and the contributions it makes and has always made through control, restraint and its special model of democratic responsibility in defence, both national and collective. I wish all future new members well in helping to maintain these proud traditions.

PROF. FRANCOIS HEISBOURG, HEAD OF FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH, FRANCE

Welcome! Welcome to the club! But it is definitely not the club that the enlargement countries thought they were going to join when they first embarked on this rather long road some years ago. This is the NATO of the era in which it is the mission that makes the coalition. This is a new world. This is not the world of permanent alliances. So what I would like to do in the next few minutes is to have a look at what NATO is, what it is not and what may happen. What it is not - is fairly clear: since the Kosovo air campaign, NATO is no longer a war machine. The principle of unity of command suffered seriously during the Kosovo air campaign.

The Americans discovered that it was exceedingly painful to have two rival chains of command each headed by an American General Officer: one was the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the subordinate called the European
commander General Wesley Clark, and the other chain of command was the one headed by General Wesley Clark to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were contributors. This is never going to happen again. NATO is no longer a war machine. I would add that this is purely an element of reassurance for our Russian friends.

Secondly, NATO is no longer an automatic defence pact. We discovered that on September 12th, we learnt that Article 5 of the Treaty meant exactly what is written in Article 5, no more and, I hope, no less, but certainly not the Article 5 we thought we had during the Cold War. Is this a tremendously disturbing development? Not necessarily, given the fairly low level of direct threat of military invasion in Europe today.

Thirdly, although NATO is part of the fight against terrorism with global reach, it is not going to be at the heart of the fight against terrorism. The financial, economic, political, police dimensions of the fight against terrorism with global reach are done elsewhere in places where culture and organisation are more appropriate to this task than NATO. So a NATO which would try to put itself, to depict itself as being at the heart of the fight against terrorism is going to fail. What is NATO? Well, NATO is this tremendous force, force projecting stability and freedom, which has just been described by Alyson Bailes, and I do not think I need to go into that further. This is NATO, which fulfils Petersburg tasks in the Balkans, this is NATO functioning as a highly effective OSCE in uniform. But I do not think you were aiming to join OSCE, when you decided to embark on this road a few years ago.

NATO is also, and very importantly, a producer of the public good known as interoperability – the ability for armed forces to work together. This is something, which has always been very difficult to do, but NATO is certainly the place in the world, which does it the best and on a broader scale and in the most comprehensive manner. This is a public good for the members of the alliance as such, and for those members of the alliance who wish to pursue military endeavours either in the form of coalitions of the able and the willing, or in the form of ESDP in the case of the EU members. The question here rises: Will NATO continue to be able to fulfil its interoperability-producing mission? There are two problems here: the first problem, of course, which is well publicized by our American friends, and rightly so, is that the Europeans have not been spending enough money in order to enable their armed forces to continue to be fully interoperable at the top end of the spectrum with their American partners. Although some countries in Europe tend to be serious on these matters, not all of them have them.

But the second problem, which is somewhat less publicized, has to do with the evolution of the American armed forces, most of which no longer, if they ever did, use NATO procedures or have adopted NATO standards. The part of the American force structure which uses NATO standards and practices is about 9% of the US force structure – that is the European command of NATO, EUCOM. But CINCPAC, CINCCOM, the Northern Command, the Southern Command, these are not NATO-fähig, to use the German expression. And those of us who have been operating in the Indian Ocean and in Central Asia over the last few months know exactly what I mean. It is bloody difficult to work with allies who do not use the same systems as those, which have been agreed upon jointly in Brussels. This leads to a broader question: if it is true that we are in the age of missions-making coalitions, you are not going to have effective, immediately effective coalitions if you do not have interoperable forces to begin with? You are not going to get interoperable forces if you have not had upstream harmonization of standards, procedures, and the like. That is what we are losing in large part because our American friends are moving out of NATO, and this is something, which I think deserves to be highlighted.

In conclusion, just a reminder: NATO is a multilateral institution, multilateral organization. It has a leading nation called the United States of America, but it has 18 other members who are not the United States of America. The challenge for us all here, and the challenge for the newcomers also will be to see how we can continue to make NATO function as an effective multilateral, a meaningful multilateral organization in the world where multilateralism is not the fashion. Thank you.

PROF. BRONISLAV GEREMEK, FORMER MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, POLAND

I would like to ask a question and to try to answer this question. The question is, whether NATO in new situation should become a global alliance?
When we think of the international situation after September 11th, we should treat this new situation rather as an expression of existing problems, and now as a real challenge. What we see in this new international situation is a very deep crisis of values; we see a permissive society confronted with fanatic aptitude to die and to kill. We see a proliferation of arms of massive destruction. To this challenging situation the world did not answer by a kind of international order. The answer was rather an international disorder or, as a French political scientist called it – politics of chaos. What we can see is the situation in terms of a contradiction between the progress of means of destruction and the weakness of the human thinking.

I have the feeling that one of problems of the political environment of the NATO issue is the relationship between Europe and America, and as we could see from the first presentation on the stage, America and Europe could jointly face this new situation acting together. We are heading to the same set of fundamental values: respect of human dignity, respect of human rights, but between Europe and America we see a growing gap which is separating these both partners.

In my sense, NATO is an alliance, which can answer both problems that we are facing: this crisis of values and the weakness of international answer, and also the gap between America and Europe. NATO, a defence alliance, based on solidarity and community of values should see that if the sources of new threats are beyond Europe, the Alliance should accept it to be ready to act beyond the territory which was attributed to the Alliance in the first founding acts as a natural space of action. It is possible to see in this new international situation NATO acting as a global alliance. And with this action, NATO could help to overcome the growing gap between America and Europe, and also NATO could become a global alliance. From the Polish point of view, NATO from the beginning was the alliance about freedom and stability, and we would like to see the continuation of this alliance. But we do believe that after Prague NATO should face new dangers, and the answer should be quite new. The debate on the future of NATO after Prague has a crucial importance. Thank you.
not only in the Balkans but even in Afghanistan or in the Middle East. And now with the challenge it is time for us to think and behave as responsible members of a larger community of human beings.

My last remark is a few words about history, history as research, not so much history as memory or identity. I am very glad to see here professor Schwab from the United States, Member of our Presidential Historical Commission. Four years ago we have created the Presidential Historical Commission. We have the honour to chair the Holocaust Subcommission. Sure, and speaking fairly frankly, the Commission was created if not under terrible international pressure, then, of course, on very strong international encouragement. Up to now we have published already six volumes of research on crimes committed by Soviet and Nazi occupation against the people of Latvia. And even after Prague, regardless of any decision taken by Prague, we should continue with our work, independently of the decision of Prague, and what is most significant, we should pay more attention to some questions of the Soviet and Nazi occupation. First of all, there is a most painful question: why Latvians collaborated with Communists and Nazi, and why Latvians, not as a nation at all, with at least a few thousands, collaborated with Communists and Nazi in the destruction of whole nations of our society, first of all – in the destruction of our Jews. We should continue research on these questions after Prague, and many, many years after that. Thank you very much!

CARL BILDT, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN

When we listened to Senator Lott yesterday, he referred to Churchill, Fulton, and that was, of course, why NATO came into existence. But as we know, since more than ten years ago, there is no longer any Soviet Union, and no longer any Soviet armies, and there is no longer any iron curtain, so what on earth are we, NATO, in business for? I think there are three major missions and tasks. The first, most easily forgotten, that we need to remind ourselves of all the time, is the necessity to preserve peace in this wider European area, that is, the member nations of the wider NATO and the wider and larger European Union. Peace not through military returns but peace through military integration, and in the European Union – peace through political and economic integration. We are doing this in the part of the world that has produced the most of wars in the past centuries; wars that we even exported all over the globe with devastating consequences. So that task, natural as it can seem to be, when we debate, remains the fundamental one, and the one that must never be neglected: stability through military integration in the wider European area to the west of Russia, and perhaps, Ukraine.

The second mission that has been developing during the 1990s is the mission of undertaking peace-keeping operations in the European environment, primarily in the Balkans. Here I sometimes refer to NATO as the EDPKO (European Department of Peace-Keeping Operations): we have in the UN a department of peace-keeping operations, which is running peace-keeping operations. They have been handed over to NATO, in Europe. So this is the EDPKO that is taking care of UN-like peace operations in Europe. They are fairly UN-like; we have to acknowledge that. With exception of the US inclination to do air campaigns, NATO forces are as reluctant to take robust action on the ground, as the UN forces are, because at the end of the day every single platoon commander or company commander, battalion commander, brigade commander, answers to his own political authorities. They are equally keen or reluctant to take action irrespectively of whether it happens to be through UN or NATO chain of command. But this is an immensely important task where NATO is doing a good work.

By doing these two things – peace through military integration and peace-keeping operations in Europe – it, of course, integrates military forces. It works with issues of interoperability, it works with issues of military capability, it creates what has been referred to in the debate as a toolbox of military instruments that can then be used for different military missions.

That brings me naturally to the third task, which is the most demanding, most difficult, and the one that needs to be discussed. That is – NATO as an instrument for transatlantic dialogue on the security threats that are there in the wider environment, be that the war against global terrorism, be that the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, or be that the very real dangers of instability in the near abroad of Europe and the need to come to some sort of consensus across the Atlantic on how to handle these particular threats. And they are, of course, massive. When we look to the south and to the southeast of Europe, we have what we might refer to as the Greater Middle East. That is 300 million people today. There will be 400 million people within,
say, fifteen years. They have, if we take away oil and gas, stagnant economies. The total export of the area, if we take away energy, is less than the export of Finland. None of them practically have responsive political systems that can really take care of the need for change. Accordingly, we see tensions building up throughout this area, which is like the Jew assault in series of explosions and implosions during the next ten, fifteen years. Palestine – Israel is in the focus today. We are all alike, and we know that heading for military confrontation over Iraq will require a massive new peace-keeping involvement in that area in the next few years. But there will be others, and there is no way in which we can avoid or should avoid proper transatlantic dialogue on these particular issues. Here, of course, more needs to be done. The Europeans must be more clear, more open, more forthright, on what they see as the necessity of action in certain cases, be that weapons of mass destructions, or be that something else. The Americans must be more willing to engage in a profound policy dialogue. We cannot have a situation where we certainly have major peace-keeping operations in the Balkans put at risk practically without advance warning by our American friends, in the way that we have seen in the last few days. In both ways we need to be more open, have a better dialogue, in order to be able to handle this third major area of challenges that will be there in the years to come.

So NATO is absolutely essential for the military integration that is so important for the peace and stability in Europe, for the peacekeeping operations that we will continue to need in the Balkans for quite some time to come, for the interoperability of forces, for the capabilities, for the toolbox. And then, for the political dialogue across the Atlantic on the challenges that we can be fairly certain that we will have to tackle. We do not know the details, we do not know the timing, we know that they are there, and we know that if we do not discuss them thoroughly in advance, they will hit us even harder than will be the case anyhow. Thanks.

DR. GUSTAVO SELVA, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION OF THE PARLIAMENT, ITALY

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen! It is a pleasure and an honour for me to address you today. It is also thrilling to observe the process of reunification of our continent, taking place and to be able to take part in it.

The path of history of the past 20 years may have taken many by surprise; it has been following a winding and unpredictable course. But not those like Italy who has always steadfastly believed in democratic values. NATO is an instrument for defending these values. That is the sum total of common heritages of our civilisation. Membership of NATO is a sign; it is a sign of belonging to democracy: freedom, the state of law, for peace and progress of people. Italy believes in this value.

The world in which we live is undergoing rapid transformation. Every day there are new challenges to face. Our men and institutions are always being put to the test. In the modern world a threat to one is a threat to all. Terrorism threatens the fundamental values of our civilization. It must be countered tirelessly and using all available resources. Our greatest resource is democracy, I repeat. Our military strength depends on the free confrontation of opinions, like this morning, on the worth of civil society and individual freedom, on the authoritativeness, and the capacity of institution. This is why the admission of a new member to the Euro-Atlantic community will make us all stronger. No terrorist or criminal organization must be allowed to really endanger peace and freedom and stand in the way of a social progress.

Now I will have a keynote about a particular problem. The tragic events of 11th September have demonstrated the close connection that exists between security in the Euro-Atlantic area and stability in the Mediterranean. It is clear that the threat of international terrorism cannot be effectively kept at bay without determined and effective cooperation on the part of the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. These countries have an essential role to play in controlling illegal immigration not only from Africa but also from countries in the Far East, and in combating the trafficking in weapons and drugs, which can lead to a grave combination of factors fraught with risk and threats to the whole world, and not only to the West.

In the same way, I believe it is important to resolve the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, which is a most serious cause of instability throughout the Middle East and plays a major part in swelling the ranks of fundamentalist terrorism.
This being so, the policy pursued by NATO since the mid-1990s has proven to be particularly far-sighted and successful in contributing towards shoring up security and stability in the Mediterranean. I am referring to the initiative launched at the January 1994 Brussels Summit with Italy’s strong support to open up dialogue and establish cooperation with a number of countries in this region.

The main purpose of the Mediterranean Dialogue is to contribute to the stability and security of the Mediterranean area, and to create greater understanding between all the countries involved. The Dialogue is therefore intended to forge closer ties which can lead to broader cooperation in the field of security without, for the time being, going so far as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) model being promoted by NATO in Central-Eastern Europe.

At the April 1999 Washington Summit, which re-thought the role of NATO in the new international scenario, the purpose of the Mediterranean Dialogue was emphasised as an integral part of NATO’s cooperative approach, and NATO confirmed its intention to heighten cooperation in areas where it has a specific contribution to make, notably in the military sphere.

With the ending of the Cold War as far-reaching geopolitical transformation has taken place in the Mediterranean, which has evolved from being a broader area in the East-West standoff and a potential theatre of military conflict into a region in which North-South collaboration and political, economic and military partnership is possible. Yet at the same time, the far-reaching economic, social and religious differences between the countries lying along both shores of the Mediterranean make mutual understanding and joint action difficult. The Mediterranean Dialogue is therefore an ideal opportunity for open-ended communication to enable all the parties to understand each other’s positions and create the confidence and trust needed to contribute effectively to developing stable and peaceful ties between the countries that lie on the southern shore of our sea. The Dialogue can therefore be considered as a target preventive diplomacy strategy.

Secondly, the Mediterranean Dialogue creates fruitful synergies with the initiatives of the European Union, particularly the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which began at the November 1995 Barcelona Conference, where three areas of cooperation were identified: political and security, economic and financial, and socio-cultural.

Lastly, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue marks the balanced completion of the external dimension and action of the Alliance, which is committed to eastwards expansion, the Partnership for Peace, and strengthening collective security in the Balkans. The presence of Egyptian, Jordanian and Moroccan forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as part of the IFOR-SFOR and KFOR operations bears witness to the effective contribution that joint North-South action can make to peacekeeping.

In this respect, I think it is appropriate to emphasise that it is the Mediterranean Dialogue that makes it possible to force the necessary attention on the southern flank of the Alliance, reducing the risks that the eastward enlargement policy might engender. In reality, the strategic objectives towards the East and the South are mutually reinforcing and complementary, giving a global dimension to Euro-Atlantic interests. A balance must therefore be struck in the enlargement and cooperation processes involving the Euro-Atlantic institutions, to avoid creating competition between East and South, and to give adequate importance to the Mediterranean perspective. In this way, by enhancing mutual knowledge, cooperation and confidence the foundations will be laid for social and economic development, which is an essential condition for terrorism to be properly and effectively prevented.

Italy is wholly committed to this process, of which it is a passionate advocate, including its strategic aspects. For it is amazing how rapidly the events of history and international relations can change. I still recall the way in which, when NATO was created in 1949, doubts were expressed in some quarters about the wisdom of Italy’s joining, considering her tenuous geographical links with the Atlantic. Half a century on, we are able to see just how far-sighted that decision taken by both Italy and the Alliance was. For there is no denying the stabilising effect that Italy has had across the years in the Mediterranean area. We must therefore work to ensure that this role, strengthened by the support of the European Union and the new strategies of the Alliance, may contribute to the peace and stability of all the peoples of the Mediterranean, and root out the scourge of international terrorism.

JANIS KUKAINIS, PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF FREE LATVIANS

Thanks, Ron! Good morning!

Speaking as an American of Latvian descent, NATO enlargement to me is not only about governments and think tanks but fundamentally it is about people.
In my capacity as President of the World Federation of Free Latvians, I represent approximately 175,000 Americans, Canadians, Europeans, Australians, South Americans and Russians of Latvian descent. Yes, we do have active NGOs, even in Russia. Collectively we support the Baltic States’ inclusion in the NATO, and we are working in our individual countries through our NGOs to bring attention to the Baltic States’ desire to join NATO. We are actively involved in the work of Latvia’s own NATO NGO, the Latvian Transatlantic Organization, which is headed by the former Latvian ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Ojars Kalnins.

Why are we doing this? First, we are deeply committed to the Baltic States, the security of the Baltic States. We want the Baltic States to be part of European and Transatlantic institutions. But the fundamental driving force behind their efforts is that we feel this our duty to help our ancestral homelands, rebound from the 50 years of obscurity, foisted upon them by the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and once again the Soviet Union. I have just spent the last seven weeks in Latvia trying to get to know and understand Latvians on the people-to-people level. Believe me, they are committed to the same shared values and objectives as the people of our respective western homelands: democracy, rule of law, and they do understand free markets.

How do we, living in America and in the West, provide this NATO assention support? I will speak about our efforts in the United States because the US is the focal point.

In the US there are little over 1 million Americans of Baltic descent, our umbrella organization is the Joint Baltic-American National Committee, it was established in 1960. It is the umbrella organization for the American Latvians Association, the Lithuanian – American Council, and Estonian – American National Committee. We work together as a team because separate there are not enough of us to be effective. Since 1996 we activated our NATO support programme, and it was really kicked off by President Clinton’s speech in October 1996 in Detroit. We helped support the first enlargement with letter writing, lobbying, and so on in behalf of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Our basic mantra is that we have always worked at all three Baltic States be accepted at the same time.

As I said, in the large America million is not that much. So we are also active members of the Central – Eastern European coalition, which consists of 18 organizations, and that organization represents 22 million Americans of Eastern European descent. Not being blessed with a lot of humility, and so on, wherever I go to speak somewhere with my senators or to the administration, I always speak for 22 million Americans. I would also like to thank in this effort the Polish - American Congress for their advice, example, materials and support. I also would be amiss in not mentioning a very well known Polish – American resistance fighter, journalist, patriot Mr Ian Novak, who even now at 89 years of age still provides us advice and moral support.

Since 1996 we have activated Baltic Americans and their supporters across the US in support of the Baltic States NATO efforts. We have published a handbook based on the successful Polish model, which describes in detail what organisations and individuals as Americans can do at grass roots level to support the Baltic States’ assention to NATO. We distribute many thousands of these handbooks. We have developed a very comprehensive NATO website to inform people about the desirability of NATO expansion, and I think the editors, (here I saw Rojs Dauburs, (Rojs, stand up!) and for the other, the non-Baltic candidates, it would be good to know him), and I think Rojs would be glad to work with you, to include your material on the website. Continuing our work at grass roots level, five states, Iowa, Michigan, Illinois, Delaware, Minnesota have passed resolutions in their legislatures in support of the Baltic States’ assention to NATO. We have actions in almost every state in the Union to achieve additional resolutions. There are approximately 1,000 Baltic NGOs, and NGO is, you know, churches, fraternal organizations, book clubs, cultural groups, who are actively participating in continuous letter writing campaigns to our senators and to the administration. During the past year I lived in Detroit and I have spent over a hundred days outside on weekends and so on, visiting Baltic activists, and we found that 29 Baltic activity centres are called a kind of our marines who on a moment’s notice can bombard the administration and our representatives and inform them of our support for the Baltic States’ inclusion in NATO. Every day we go to visit administration, officials, and congressional offices.

I just noticed at this conference there is a kind of euphoria to Summit, and it is also among the Baltic activists in the US at times that NATO’s assention is
a done deal. It is not. I personally believe, and we believe that at Prague a large number of countries will be invited to join NATO. I also know that the candidate countries still have very much to do, in meeting the MAP, achieving support from the 19 member countries, and there will also be provocations by forces opposed to enlargement who will cast the Baltic States and another invitees in a negative light by exaggerated corruption claims and so on. And again I want to quote one of my favourite people, an American philosopher and baseball player Yogi Bar nel, we have to remember: “It is not over till it is over”, and I hope you understand that.

Our effort is truly a grass roots people effort. Our backbone, my organisation’s - the Baltic organisation’s backbone consists of volunteers and individual donations. We are not directly supported by any Baltic government or the US government. We get along very well because we share the same objectives: the Baltic States in NATO, a whole and free Europe.

In closing, I offer my organisation’s support to the other candidate countries in their accession efforts. Thank you!

DISCUSSION

Moderator: Dr. Ronald Asmus, Senior Fellow, US Council on Foreign Relations
- We have now 35 minutes for discussion. I would like to encourage discussion among the panellists but above all – with the audience. So with that, I would like to open the floor for discussion. Pier Carlson. Pier, please identify yourself!

- Pier Carlson. I am the Director of the Danish Foreign Affairs Institute. Yesterday the Polish President took the initiative to say that the Vilnius process should not stop by Prague but should move on, taking care of the countries on the other side of the new dividing line, working to integrate those countries into the Transatlantic and European room. I think that is a good idea and I think that we should be thinking about it. But I would like to ask some of the panellists about the ideas because they are not as easy to implement, as they are to suggest, of course.

Let us start with Russia. Unfortunately, we do not have any Russians on the panel but there are Russians in the room. The first issue, of course, is the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. There is a lot of noise about Kaliningrad at the moment, not because of NATO enlargement but because of EU enlargement.
But if we move further east, there is a country called Belarus, whom we tend to forget to talk about very often. How do we deal with our new neighbour Belarus in the future? And then there is a big country of Ukraine, which is important to all of us, and there were nice words about integrating Ukraine yesterday. But how do we do it, and what is the goal? Are we inviting Ukraine to join NATO?

Finally, there are the small countries in the Caucasus; at the moment some of our Baltic friends have established cooperation with Georgia, where Georgia is taking some of the good experience from our Baltic friends in integration. Is that a line to move further? How do the panelists look upon it? How does Russia look upon such ideas? Is that a line to move further? How do they prefer to do it on a unilateral way, or do they want to do it with us? Thanks.

R.A.
- I am going to collect two or three questions and turn to our panelists. Pier, are you directing your question to anyone in particular on the panel, or all the panelists?

P.C.
- Free choice.

R.A.
- OK. Janis Kazocins, at the far back corner.

Janis Kazocins

- Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Janis Kazocins, I am a serving British army officer. What I would like to say is to make a comment about NATO procedures, which were mentioned earlier on by one of the panelists. Military people are generally fairly conservative, I think we would all agree, and very frequently military people are also accused of fighting the last war instead of the one they are involved with. And I would just raise the question: Are the procedures, which were worked out for NATO for a major, possibly global war, perhaps beginning on North German Plain, really the procedures, which we now require to fight and confront the new challenges of the 21st century? I think it is terribly important, that is the first step to moving forward in NATO and elsewhere, that we Europeans understand the frustration felt by the United States, that here in Europe we have 2 million men under arms and still we are hardly able to manage to find a little force to take care of a small problem, relatively speaking, like Kosovo.

For the last ten years Western Europeans have lectured Central-Eastern Europeans on how to do things our way – do it our way and you will be OK. What this has resulted in is that we are slowly developing another set of small but perfectly formed armed forces. And the question I would raise is: which of these two groups is intellectually best prepared to face the challenges of the 21st century - those in Western Europe where basically the changes are that we have only reduced the size and scope of the armed forces, or those in Central-Eastern Europe where a fundamental review has taken place about the requirements of defence and security in the broadest sense, and some very difficult decisions are being made about priorities and requirements?

To wind up, what I would say is that I feel here is a very important role for NATO because if NATO’s constituent parts are going to be militarily effective, then small and perfectly formed national armed forces is not the way forward. Some military sovereignty is going to have to be given up. We expect that from the Central-Eastern European countries but from the Western countries’ point
of view it is very difficult to understand why, for instance, is it that a number of small NATO countries now are all vying to buy new supersonic jet airplanes. Is that really something, which is desperately needed by NATO, or is this simply a chronic waste of resources? The Latvian national poet Rainis in his epic play about Lapclesis, the Latvian national hero says: He will succeed through changes. I think this is something, which NATO will need to do, and I suspect it will be the West European nations of NATO, which in military terms will have to do the most changing.

R.A.
- Thank you very much, Janis. I think those are two excellent questions, and I think we have enough to start a discussion with the panelists. I could see a number of my panelists nodding as you spoke, Janis. So we have both Pier’s question on Kaliningrad, Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus, and Janis’ question about whether we really are preparing ourselves militarily for the challenges of the future, and whether Central Europeans are really looking toward the right model.

I can see Francois is here to start, so let me say I will take as many people on the panel that would like to address these issues but not everyone needs to if you do not want to. We will start with Francois.

Francois Heisbourg, Head of Foundation for Strategic Research, France
- First on Pier’s question. Russia: there are really two issues here. First, Kaliningrad, which you mentioned, with one man’s exclave being another man’s enclave. But this is essentially an issue for the European Union to handle. This is precisely the sort of case where the things, which Alyson mentioned earlier on, become of the essence: how do you control the flow of illegal goods, how do you control cross border criminality.

The second issue, concerning Russia, is what will become of the Council of Twenty. Either the Council of Twenty is used in a meaningful way by all of the partners, in which case it will become in effect a NAC without treaty powers. But in terms of substance, it will and it should be discussing the sort of things, which are discussed in NAC. And that, of course, does oppose a broader question: what then becomes of NATO? I am amongst those who consider that in the long run, if the Council of Twenty actually works, then Russian membership of NATO is something, which would not be a fantasy.

On Ukraine and others, I think we have a fairly firm guide with the parry criteria, if I can call them that, to the extent that NATO in political terms is more effective and more efficient than OSCE, then there is no reason why countries which meet the criteria, should not become members of NATO. Ukraine is probably on the break of that, Belarus and the Caucasians definitely not.

On the military questions - well, first of all, I think NATO actually has moved in terms of its planning and in terms of its procedures quite a way away from the Cold War model. But even admitting that it has not done so sufficiently, there is a distinction to be drawn between the planning on the one hand and the procedures on the other. It is essentially good if navies, for example, can automatically transmit data in a secure and efficient manner between each other, whether you are having a cold war or a hot war, or a peace support operation. Well, in the Indian Ocean, you – the Brits, we - the French, our Italian friends, our German friends, we are all on NATO link 16. Our American friends in so far that they hail from, let’s say, CINCPAC, the Pacific Command, they do not have link 16, so we cannot talk with them, in terms of exchanging data transmission. And this is not because NATO is technologically inferior but simply because that part of the US armed forces is not using the same procedures as, let us say, the 6th Fleet back in the Mediterranean, which is a US force, and a very high-tech one at that.

The same situation prevails in the aeronautical business. The NATO secure communication system, which is used by our flyers; we have 600 people today with the French in Kyrgyzstan, we operate with our American friends, and it is sometimes difficult because they do not use NATO standards, and NATO procedures, and NATO systems. This is not a criticism either from an American or European standpoint about, you know, who has a better system. The question is, do we have systems, which can actually talk with each other? And the answer is: increasingly no, and it is not simply because Europeans are underdeveloped, technologically inferior wimps. That is not the case, certainly not concerning the things I am talking about now. Now, as to who should be the example, to whom to turn: and here there are two ways of spinning that chat. First, the resources. Americans still ask resources that are tremendously important, so I will accept that. Well, the Western Europeans do spend on defence about 15 times more than the Central and Eastern European countries. If they are spending 15 times more, it is unlikely that the 15th part is going to be the trendsetter or the trendmaker. That is, if one accepts that quantity has a quality of its own. Now if one looks at the qualitative aspects, it is true that some of the Western European countries have not engaged in a substantial military reform, the sort of reform, which the
Brits, which the French, which the Spanish, which the Dutch have been entering into, have not yet occurred in Germany or in Italy. And indeed, I would look toward some of the things which are going on in, let us say, Sweden, rather that I would look at things which are going on in Germany, for inspiration.

And finally, on this point, have the Central and Eastern European countries seized the opportunity of military reform as much as they could have, given the circumstances? If you look at force structures in Hungary, in Poland, in Romania, are they very, very different from what they were during the cold war? They do tend to resemble the German or Italian model rather more than, let us say, the British model. And I think the British have a better model than, let us say, the Germans or the Italians, in terms of having a defence structure, which is geared to the requirements of the post 9.11.H.

And the last point, combat aircraft in Central and Eastern Europe, I completely agree. I have spent much of my life working in the defence business, so I am not prone to criticising that business uselessly. It is an important business, and it is a legitimate business. But if you do not absolutely have to modernize with new kit, you know, do not start by purchasing top of the line, extraordinarily expensive combat aircraft when there are so many other, more important and less costly things, which need to be done. That is really a piece of advice, which I have not ceased to be giving over the last ten years, and I hope it will continue to be heeded. Big contracts means big opportunities for corruption, and that is why they do tend to come to the top of the pile. Do go down the road of useful smaller contracts rather than bigger contracts, which may not be quite as useful but which have under attractions, which are not military related.

- Thank you, Francois. I am going to turn to Alyson and Carl, and then I am going to go back to the floor and allow some of the participants to talk.

Alyson Bailes, Head of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Thank you. A brief comment that all of these issues just raised could be much better handled if the EU and NATO worked together in cooperation or at least in synergy. That is not difficult to demonstrate. If we want military reform and better coordination, better interoperability in Western Europe, which will now be expanded, of course, because the EU will also have new members, the EU has quite effective instruments and political pressures to bring to bear. And arguably, the EU members’ performance would be even worse if we have not had the headline goal, a clear thing for them to aim at for a couple of years. I think it is also true on the issue of dealing with neighbouring countries. The EU has begun an internal dialogue on dealing with the different problems posed by Ukraine, by Belarus, by Moldova. It would be useful if, broadly speaking, the motives and solutions, which guide the EU’s handling of that, were also behind the actions of NATO. What these two institutions together have to work on with the new borderlands, is to have a calming and stabilizing effect on the one hand, and on the other hand, frankly to promote change because none of these are good countries, yes, fully, in their internal governance, in their security behaviour or whatever, keeping stability while promoting changes, something we were pretty good in the Cold War, for instance, through the OSCE process. And the task should not be beyond us if the different western institutions collaborate and bring their different kinds of wisdom and experience to there. As far as I know of all of the new countries, which are going to be joining the two institutions, and many will, of course, join both, none shares stupid old West European feelings where some countries were more pro-NATO, and some were pro-EU. As far as I know, the new members all want both institutions to be strong and to work together, and I hope very much that they will be able to help us in overcoming some of the remaining obstacles to a fully rational NATO – EU cooperation and synergy. Thank you!

R.A.

Carl Bildt!

Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister of Sweden
- I believe what has been put forward as the Kaliningrad problem is essentially a EU problem, and the question of access, and that, I would guess, will be sorted out by the time of the Copenhagen EU Council.

There are some military issues, though that needs to be addressed. One of them is, of course, with the membership of the three Baltic nations in NATO: what will be the military commanding in the Baltic area? What will be the role of the Polish, Danish, German core structure that is now been set up in Szczecin? And which are the opportunities that are now presented for closer coordination and cooperation with the Russian forces that are in the Kaliningrad enclave or exclave? That needs to be addressed and needs to be discussed.

The question of going beyond that, the question you asked should the Vilnius
The reforms that we need are clear; that we, Europeans, need better and more capable, and somewhat more numerous forces for expeditionary offer. We need to be there with America. But we need also to say to the Americans that they need more forces that are capable of somewhat more aggressive peacekeeping operations of the sort that we need, for example, in the Balkans. We cannot have a division across the Atlantic where the Americans fight the wars and we police the peace. That is not going to work, both for military system but primarily, for political one. Here we put the question why cannot we put the forces together, we – Europeans, for Kosovo? We can, no problem. I mean, Kosovo is not a military challenge primarily; Kosovo is a political challenge. And if it were only European forces on the ground, which is tactically perfectly feasible, the political challenge would be more demanding, as we learnt so vividly during the early phases of the Bosnian war. That is also why we need somewhat better burden chain when it comes to expeditionary warfare, capabilities and peacekeeping warfare, across the Atlantic, to share responsibilities on the ground because that means also sharing the political responsibility for the political solutions that are necessary in these particular situations. There are very few problems in the world where there is purely a military solution, military, as an instrument to achieve a political solution, and that has to be forged across the Atlantic.

R.A.
- Thank you, Carl. Bronislav has asked very briefly to address Pier’s question regarding Kwasniewski’s proposal we heard yesterday on Ukraine.

Bronislav Geremek, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland
- I am very much impressed by the good approval of Mr Kwasniewski’s idea of yesterday. I think that it is important to see in what way this Vilnius Group, together with the Visegrad Group, can act together. I think that, first of all, it will concern the adaptation to the NATO requirements, also to the military capabilities. We, the three first members of NATO, have some experience in this field.

It can be also a political dialogue. I do believe that this political dialogue should concern questions, which were mentioned – the Kaliningrad enclave, Belarus, Ukraine. But first of all, I think, it will be a dialogue among the three Baltic States and Ukraine.

We have to develop Eastern politics for the EU and NATO. And in this respect, I would like to say two things. The first one: I do not see reasons to join the
question of NATO membership with Russia’s membership. I do not see a reason for which we should consider these questions as connected. It would be better, in my sense, to treat the question of Ukraine together with Russian willingness to join NATO. Ukraine asked for the NATO membership, Russia does not. So I do not think that this connection should be seen.

And finally, the Kaliningrad enclave: in my sense, we should see how dramatic is this question. Such an enclave is an abnormality; we know it, from the historical experience also, how difficult it is. But we have to know that we will cope with such a situation, and we should cope with such a situation in an intelligent way. The North Atlantic Council treated the question of the Kaliningrad enclave in a very good, reasonable way. I could not say the same as far as the European Union is concerned. At the beginning, from the European Union’s side, concerning Kaliningrad, there were some discussions between the European Commission and the Russian Government without consulting countries like Poland, Lithuania, interested, first of all, in this question. And I am very much impressed by the clear message, which was given by the European Union, as far as the Kaliningrad enclave is concerned, in the last month: that it told to consider that it is a question, in which the Schengen Agreement should be applied. But we should see also that in this case there is a necessity of very special technology. It should be treated in a different way; human beings should not suffer from these two enlargements, the NATO enlargement and EU enlargement. And I mean the human beings in the Kaliningrad enclave. So we should find some new solution. It is a political problem we should face.

R.A.
- Thank you. I would like to get back to the floor, we only have about ten minutes left, and I would like to get as many questions. This gentleman right here first of all.

Igor Leshukov, Director of the Institute of International Affairs, St Petersburg, Russia
- I am afraid I am the only Russian attendant, which puts me somehow in an uneasy position. Just a very quick reaction to Kaliningrad, and some comments to the main issue of the Summit, to which I would like to get some reaction from the panellists.

On Kaliningrad, I am afraid, what we observe was quite predictable politisation of the issue of practical nature, primarily which was expected to be sorted out between professionals, technicalities, bureaucrats, etc. And I am also afraid that we would again see how many normal human beings would suffer from these political considerations, most of which have no relation whatsoever to Kaliningrad as such. We will see how this will be sorted out. I remain optimistic that it will happen. But it gives us a new warning signal about the constraints of the world in which we live. We observed internal domestic reaction to the Winter Olympic games in Russia; we now see the reactions to Kaliningrad. We have to be curious what might happen next.

On the discussions of that summit and the comments about the new NATO, as you see there are no Russians at all, and that somehow reflects one pleasant fact that after lots of noise, which the Russian side presented on the NATO enlargement, the message that this enlargement does not represent any issue for security concerns for Russia, finally got into Moscow that Russia has no policy apparently on that. And, having no policy, you have no comment. Having no comment, you have no attendance. This attitude could be regarded as non-constructive.
But there is also somehow a reason to reflect on a priority of issues, and the realistic assessment of what is going on because from the academic point of view, NATO through its history demonstrates that it has enormous inertia of realization of all reaction to the challenges. So historically, what we need to develop is conventional capacity in Europe to react to, so to say, career implication. That was already a new environment, which requested nuclear capabilities. When the nuclear capabilities had been developed, then it was understood that they are not guiding us safely against the threats like the Cuban crisis. So in the situation today, when we prepare to the NATO enlargement: is that really a priority? Because the things are more or less sorted out; everybody knows what are the political decisions; we know where the countries stand, where they belong, and basically this enlargement is only going to codify the things, which have been solved so far already.

If this discussion would take place in 1994 – 1995, that would be quite different. I would assume that if this would be a discussion on Ukraine membership - that would be an issue of immense political importance because the political decision on the Ukrainian side has not been taken yet. The choice of Ukraine is not yet defined. That would be an immense issue for Russia. But I am just wondering if it is really a big, big issue for the countries around it, around the Vilnius group, is that really an issue for the NATO as an alliance. Thank you.

George Schwab, USA National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Thank you, Mr Chairman, for recognising me! I wish to touch on a point that has been touched upon by the German colleague and the lady among others. It is a core issue and perhaps not directly related to what we are discussing, namely, one thing that is being forgotten, the obvious thing that is being forgotten is the relevance of the United States in the issue of European security and well-being. There is a growing crisis of confidence in the United States with our friends and allies, which I think we should bear in mind: where the United States is being lambasted at the EU end, where the United States has been treated in the discussions leading up to the Ottawa Treaty, so much so that when we in the Foreign Policy Community in the United States sometimes speak of our European friends and allies, I mean we sort of have a tendency at times to say: well, forget the Europeans. It is a very serious issue; I would like to call this to your attention to bear this in mind in discussing transatlantic relations. Thank you very much!

Kalev Stoicescu, Chairman of the Estonian ATA
- Thank you, Ron. I am Kalev Stoicescu. I am chairing the Estonian ATA. Well, I wanted to refer to two neighbours of ours there, particularly important to my country, Finland and Sweden. And I think, as they are both represented here at this summit by their Defence Ministers, that it is particularly important and meaningful. And as the former Prime Minister of Sweden is sitting in the panel, I would like to ask him what thoughts will he carry back home from this forum, and just to say a few words about how this process may affect his country. Thank you.

R.A.

Grisha, very quickly, we are going to have to close in a minute but I want to give you an opportunity.
Gregory Krupnikov, Co-Chairman of the Latvian Jewish Community
- Thank you, Ron! First I would like to thank the only non-NATO aspirant present on this panel, Mr Carl Bildt, for the most clear, down-to-earth, and crisp comments on NATO’s present, future, weaknesses and strengths, and problems rising in the future. And then a very short comment on Mr Heisbourg’s statements on NATO as an OSCE in uniform. I would tend to disagree with that, or then put it to the extreme: NATO is not only an OSCE in uniform, NATO then would be an OSCE with some employees in uniform, and then basically Ukraine, Russia and everybody could join. Sitting here in Latvia in this conference, I believe that NATO, and I agree with Mr Carl Bildt, has defence, and police, and peace-keeping functions, which do not fully comply with the OSCE mission. And therefore, Ukraine’s, Georgia’s, or Moldova’s accession to NATO is not Ukraine being on the brink.

And another comment: I do not think if Ukraine at some moment develops to a state that it would be considered for the membership of NATO, and decides to do that, that we should have Russia’s consent on that because that would be exactly the situation perceived by many West Europeans a couple of years ago with the Baltics - what would Russia say if the Baltic States joined NATO. I do not think this is a principle, an acceptable position that there is one country in Europe, which has an explicit or implicit veto power over any other country joining NATO. Thank you!

R.A.
- Thank you, Grisha. I am afraid we have run out of time, if there is anyone on the panel that feels an intense need to speak for 20 seconds, I will allow it. I do not know, perhaps Carl, you may say your speculations on Sweden joining or not joining NATO for the coffee, and those people who want to pursue that issue. But let me just check if anyone... Marcus, very briefly.

Marcus Meckel, Member of the Bundestag
- I think, I agree with you that there are some voices in this way in America. But I think it is a dangerous development for both of us. I would agree with you that we, for instance, as Germans, have not done enough in the security matters. I would agree with you that it is not only the budget problem but some reform problems. We have some problems about that, and we have to improve our efforts. For that, during the last ten years, we have done many things, especially the changing of thinking in Germany in the population because what we have to do what is our responsibility, you know, that has changed many things that we have to fulfill for the future. In this point, I would agree with you. But I think, as to the linkage between Europe and the United States, I think it is very dangerous to minimise the role of NATO.

And, in addition, to that I think we need other kinds of cooperation between Europe and the USA. It is not only the trade question; there are other things. We have to improve our contacts, if you see all the so-called internal security questions, which are not the issue of NATO. But we have to deal with that because we have to improve our global security. Fight against terrorism is not only a military question, it is more: I think, it is the question of finance, political and other resources organized. And so we have to improve these things because I am sure the United States on their own cannot do anything, and if we break our linkages by such voices, then it would be dangerous for all of us.

And the last point, we have to see the difference between the Alliance and the coalition against terrorism. I think it is very important to improve the Alliance to see the difference between both issues. Thank you very much!
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

I have to begin by thanking Bronislav Geremek for his very kind words. It is one thing to be the voice of freedom when freedom prevails, it is another thing to be the voice of freedom in the midst of oppression and repression. And Bronislav Geremek was a voice of freedom when freedom was being repressed. That takes courage and that certainly earns our admiration. It certainly has earned my admiration of Bronislav Geremek, so thank you for your kind words.

Today we are meeting on the eve of NATO’s largest enlargement ever, and since I am not an official, I can talk freely, and prognosticate at will. And I expect that no less than four states will be admitted almost certainly, no less than five - very probably, no less than seven (quite likely) and personally I certainly hope it would be no less than seven. So whatever the number, the fact is that we are on eve of a historic triumph, of a moment of historic justice, the final undoing in Europe of the legacies of the Stalin-Hitler pact. And it is particularly evocative to mention that pact here, amidst the Baltic Republics.

I was struck yesterday by two presentations, which seemed me to convey the degree to which there is now consensus in the Euro-Atlantic community that the final injustice of the Hitler-Stalin need be undone. One presentation was by the Defence Minister of Finland and if I had not listen carefully for the introduction, I could have sworn that a Member of NATO was speaking, and I was delighted. And secondly I was very pleased to hear the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom speak so warmly of the future enlargement of NATO including the Baltic States. Because in all frankness until very recently the British were among the most sceptical ones about the desirability of now admitting the Baltic Republics. So that too reflects an emerging consensus that is to be applauded.

The approaching enlargement of NATO will soon be matched by the European Union’s expansion, and then the larger Euro-Atlantic community will be reinforced by larger Europe, and together these two transformations amount...
to a significant change in world affairs. It marks the end of the protracted European civil war that almost destroyed Europe in the course of the last century. And it is appropriate in that context to recall that NATO has been one of the principal instruments, through the re-emergence of a secure and increasingly important globally significant Europe. The approaching enlargement is thus NATO’s triumph, but also a sign of its transformation. NATO from a politically interdependent and militarily integrated alliance for the defence of Europe against a known enemy is becoming a politically interdependent and militarily integrated alliance for the security of the world’s strategically central and still-expanding region. And that triumph and its resulting transformation also help to underline the critical and continuing mission of NATO. In my mind that mission is to continue the enhancement of the substance and scope of Euro-Atlantic security. The substance and scope of Euro Atlantic security, both within Europe, as in the Balkans, where there is still much unfinished business, and also by developing additional American-European military capabilities for joint action within Europe as such, but also in areas peripheral, but strategically important to Europe. That critical mission remains central. And it should not be diluted nor diverted. It is time to think ahead because in international affairs every triumph breeds new challenges and for NATO I see the following four major ones.

The first is to make the next enlargement, as well as the previous one, into a genuine success. That means that it is absolutely critical that the new members fully perform and execute their obligations. These obligations are in some respects onerous, but their fulfilment is absolutely necessary, both prior to accession and following accession, as we know the experience of the first three recent members. Let me be perfectly blunt. Ratifications of the new members, whether seven or whatever number, in the US Congress will be more difficult than the last time. Last time the real debate took place over accession. There will be a serious debate in the US Congress in the ratification process over performance. There will be closer scrutiny of the degree to which criteria of membership and obligations assumed for membership will be performed. So this is going to be a major test, and it is a major challenge for all of us and particularly for the new members.

Secondly, since Europe whole and free cannot be delineated by a straight line running from the Gulf of Helsinki to the Bosphorus, NATO in its new composition must show genuinely strategic interest in countries further east of that line, which hope for eventual NATO membership. Ukraine has already been mentioned in this context and let me simply reiterate my own long-held view that Ukraine’s aspiration for membership in NATO should be encouraged. It should be assisted; it should not be a stick point. There will be a NATO-Ukraine summit in Prague in November of this year, and I think it will provide a felicitous occasion for the initiation of a membership action plan for Ukraine, so that Ukraine can be set on the road to eventual membership in the alliance. As a major European country it has a right to make its own sovereign decision regarding prospective membership. And the alliance as an alliance of free nations who have come together on the basis of free choice has equally the same right to make that decision regarding Ukraine’s interest in membership.

It is also appropriate, as we look ahead beyond the line from the Gulf of Helsinki to the Bosphorus, to the fate of another region which is looking increasingly toward the Euro-Atlantic community, towards NATO. I have in mind the Caucasus. But they are now independent states. It is appropriate to recall here that two years ago Turkey proposed a Stability Pact with the Caucasus, modelled to some extent on the Stability Pact for the Balkans. This idea needs further exploration, serious examination and eventual promotion. None of that implies that admission beyond Prague will go quickly. I think in all cases we realise that there will have to be a prolonged process of preparation, probably considerably longer than in the case of either the first or the second great admissions. But nonetheless, it is a process that has to be pursued. A strategic line cannot be frozen by the second enlargement. It cannot be the final enlargement. If it were to be the final enlargement, then there would be a new zone of instability immediately to the east of that line. And this is why we are dealing here with a strategic and historical process that has to be guided and also deliberately pursued.

The third major challenge that faces us as members of the North Atlantic community, as members of NATO, is that the new relationship with Russia be expanded even if Russia chooses not to apply for membership neither in NATO nor EU. That, too, is its own sovereign decision. At the moment at least it looks unlikely that Russia will choose to apply, at least in the foreseeable future. For good, reasonable, objective reasons and not necessarily because of any residual antagonism. And that over time might change in any case. But in the meantime, much depends on whether the new NATO-Russia Council can overcome the traditional hostility of the Russian bureaucracy and of the Russia military to genuine two-way NATO-Russia relations. The previously existing council was not utilised adequately. The new council creates more opportunities and also a higher status for genuine two-way cooperation. And I think that is all to the good. And one would hope that as Russia moves closer
to Europe, it itself will contribute to the resolution of those issues in the European theatre which are increasingly incompatible with the standards of democracy and the rule of law. I have in mind the anomalous political situation that continues to persist in Belarus, which is such an exception to the political definition of Europe, and to the tragedy in Chechnya, which calls for a constructive political resolution.

But one should not fear closer cooperation between NATO and Russia. I have heard voices, particularly from Central Europe, of some unease regarding the NATO-Russia Council and the new opportunities for NATO-Russia cooperation. And I think these concerns are exaggerated. They are perhaps a residue of suspicion and an anxiety that is understandable, but no longer justified. Indeed, I have even heard extreme voices to the extent that such cooperation undermines NATO and is somehow or other a setback for NATO and a success for Russia. And that makes me wonder how people who reason that way would have evaluated a totally hypothetical situation - the reverse of what has happened. Suppose NATO had disintegrated. Suppose the West had lost the Cold War. Suppose today the United States was applying for associate status in the Warsaw Pact. Would anyone consider that to be a success for American diplomacy and a danger to the Warsaw Pact?

I think we are living in a time of constructive accommodation and the cooperation with Russia is a two-way street. Russia will indeed be playing a role in cooperative endeavours with NATO. But it also points the other way. I was struck in reading the recent declaration by the United States and by Russia, signed by Presidents Putin and Bush, dealing with the strategic relationship between the two countries. And there are some passages in it which are remarkable and which have escaped much public notice and which testify to what I am speaking about. Let me read you one or two sentences in it:

_In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the United States and Russia recognize our common interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region - South Caucasus and Central Asia._

Another passage from the declaration:

_The United States and Russia will work with the Government of Georgia to enhance its security and stability and integrity (and so forth)._
REMARKS BY PROF. BRONISLAV GEREMEK,
FORMER MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND
AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE RIGA SUMMIT

Mr President, Prime Ministers, distinguished participants of this important conference! It is difficult to speak on politics, joining this language with dreams. But we should know that behind our debates on the enlargement of NATO are collective dreams of nations fighting for freedom for years and looking now for the membership in NATO not only for their own security but also to bring a new value to the North Atlantic Alliance. The Prague summit should make the decision on the enlargement, I hope that it will be a courageous decision on big enlargement, and these new member countries will obtain the feeling of security and solidarity in the same way as some years ago Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic obtained it.

The question concerns also what we can bring to the North Atlantic Alliance, we – the new members after the end of the Cold War and the division of Europe. We have this feeling that we are bringing a new geo-strategic dimension of North Atlantic activity. That is the possibility we implement – NATO's strategic aims expressed in the founding documents of the alliance. The alliance with such a presence from the Baltic coast to the Black Sea will get better possibilities of Euro-Atlantic defence and stability. And this new dimension is important also for the peace and stability in Central Asia; we are bringing some new elements to face the situation. And finally, the new members bring also a commitment, deep and thorough, to values and convictions; President Bush declared them to be the very forces of the anti-terrorism coalition.

Is it possible to see NATO, which we are joining or will join, as being in crisis? Within the half a century of history of NATO, there were different times when NATO was declared dépassé, what means obsolete and irrelevant to the challenges of the time. But they were all crisis of growth when the alliance was able to answer to new challenges; and we propose to think in the new terms of the role of NATO in the 21st century. We need such a long-term strategic alliance, truly national in its composition and global in its philosophy of action. NATO is not irrelevant to the new situation, and recent history gave the clue for this, I mean, first the Balkan engagement, also the engagement in the coalition against terrorism, example given by a country like Romania is significant. The implication of the Article 5 made by the North Atlantic Alliance was also an important contribution to this situation. And we have to see that there is no political and military alternative to this special alliance of longstanding journey - America and Europe. United States and the European Union presented a very important support for the market democracy oriented transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. This support was the very expression of the North Atlantic solidarity and would be doubtful without the NATO framework. Europe needs America, as well as America needs Europe as part of the global game. And NATO gave also a difficult situation last year, a kind of legitimacy of the military action, of an involvement of a country like Germany in this new situation; the German participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It also matters also. In this sense, I would say that the Prague Summit agenda is important for the future of the alliance and should be seen in a connection of three big issues: NATO enlargement as chances and challenge; NATO - Russia and NATO - Ukraine relationship as an announcement to new challenges in the international situation, and also the defence capabilities improvement. We have the feeling that this question is related very deeply to the enlargement issue and to the new international situation.

Ladies and gentlemen, NATO is a community of values to ensure freedom and security, to protect democracy, human rights and the rule of law. At Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic's accession the policy of open doors was declared by NATO but we have promised to us, to our neighbour countries, to our friends in the region that we will do everything to keep the door open. And we can say now, before Prague, that the door is open. It is very important now to see in what way the alliance, which we are joining, will become a global alliance. If the threats are coming from beyond Europe, the answers also should be given out of this natural territory of the North Atlantic solidarity. NATO should become a global player in the international game.

Ladies and gentlemen, for a man of my generation and my experience, this decision, Prague decision, and the vision of NATO after Prague is the very end of the World War II. It is, for the first time, the declaration that people can decide on their own fate, and their freedom is the very matter of international politics. And we can be proud of it, but that is a beginning of a discussion.
Published by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia
Photos: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia
Brīvības Blvd.36, LV1395, Rīga, Latvia
Tel.: (371) 7016210; 7016201
Fax: (371) 7 828 121
E-mail: info@mfa.gov.lv
http://www.mfa.gov.lv
http://www.rigasummit.lv

Latvian Transatlantic Organization
Fl. 3, Rupniecības str. 10, LV1235, Riga, Latvia
Tel.: (371) 7322883
Fax: (371) 7106202
E-mail: lato@lato.lv
http://www.lato.lv