• Latvia has joined important treaties and conventions and initiatives on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament
• Important international agreements and treaties regulating control of conventional weapons are also binding upon Latvia
• Other international treaties, agreements and initiatives in the field of conventional weapons

One of the more important elements of Latvian security policy is responsible action in the areas of armament control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is especially important not to permit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at a time when the threat of terrorism is very real for the entire international community. Latvia honours its commitments both as a state party to all the main agreements and regimes of armaments control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and by developing and implementing a strict export control policy.

Latvia has joined important treaties and conventions and initiatives on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on disarmament:

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NTP

• The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NTP) that came into force in 1970 (signed in 11968) is the principal document for the global regime of non- proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament. To date, 190 countries have joined the NTP, including the five recognised nuclear weapon states: the USA, Russia, UK, France, and China. Latvia joined the Treaty in 1992.
• The substance of the NTP is contained in its three "pillars": non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1 July 1998): http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/NPTEnglish_Text.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957 within the United Nations Organisation (UN), is an institution for global co-operation on nuclear issues. The Agency has 151 member countries. Latvia joined the Agency in 1997.
• The aim of the IAEA is to promote safe development of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes (Atoms for Peace) and it works in three areas:
  • verifying that nuclear material at the states’ disposal is not used for military purposes (the IAEA monitors the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons within the system of safeguards);
  • safety of nuclear material and infrastructure (by developing international standards and manuals, assist countries in taking care of safe storage and use of radioactive substances);
  • the use of nuclear research and technologies for the needs of developing countries with the aim of reducing poverty, disease and nature pollution.
• In 2008, the Safeguards Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), its non-nuclear-weapon states and the IAEA took effect together with the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement, which is the current basis for Latvia’s co-operation with the IAEA. This invalidated a bilateral Agreement on the Application of Safeguards, signed between Latvia and the IAEA in 1993, as well as the 2001 Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Latvia and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards.
• Technical co-operation with the IAEA takes place at the level of the Ministry of Environment and Regional Development and subordinated institutions (radiation safety, waste management, etc.)

Website of the International Atomic Energy Agency: http://www.iaea.org/

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – CTBT

• The Treaty has been open for signing since 1996; as of now, 182 states have signed the Treaty and 153 states have ratified it. The Treaty will come into effect 180 days after the states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have ratified it (with the nuclear technology capacity as of 1996). Latvia signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 2001.
• The CTBT bans all nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion on the ground, underground, in the atmosphere and underwater, in order to constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive verification regime, i.e. the International Monitoring System (IMS) including 377 monitoring stations in various continents, was established to follow possible nuclear explosions on the planet over an uninterrupted twenty four hour cycle. The system comprises four technologies: seismological (registers vibrations in the Earth crust), hydroacoustic (registers acoustic waves in the water), infrasound (registers sound frequencies below the level of human hearing) and radionuclide (detects radioactive waste particles in the atmosphere). If required, the regime also provides for on-site inspections.
• A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) was established for the enforcement of the Treaty. While the Treaty has not taken effect, operating at present is the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.
• Latvia regards the CTBT will provide a significant contribution to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the global nuclear disarmament process. Latvia acknowledges the important role of a legally binding test ban and a trustworthy monitoring system in ensuring peace and international security.

Website of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation: http://www.ctbto.org/

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction – BTWC

• The Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and distribution of biological and toxic weapons and raw materials and equipment intended to create, transport or use such weapons for hostile purposes or in armed conflicts.
• Under the Convention, a state must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes existing biological and toxic raw materials, within nine months of the Convention coming into force.
• Latvia has been a member country of the Convention since 1997, and has none of the weapons prohibited by the Convention at its disposal.

Website of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction: http://www.opbw.org/

Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction - CWC

• The Convention took effect in 1997 and currently has 188 States Parties. Latvia joined the Convention in 1996.
• The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, distribution and use of chemical weapons and chemical substances used in their production. It provides that a member country must destroy all chemical weapons at its disposal and equipment needed for their production, as well as any chemical weapons it has stored in the territory of another member country. Under the CWC, member countries co-operate to promote the use of chemical raw materials for peaceful purposes, and provide assistance to countries in case of threat of attack by chemical weapons.
• The implementing mechanism of the CWC is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Website the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: http://www.opcw.org/

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

• A global initiative put forward by U.S. President George Bush in June 2003 that aims at enhancing co-operation among its participants so as to impede and control trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. The initiative has been endorsed by more than 95 countries, including Latvia.
• The PSI works on the basis of Interdiction Principles. According to those principles, the states commit themselves to undertake effective measures for interdicting the transfer or transport of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to terrorists and to the states of proliferation concern. The principles call on states to avoid getting involved in trading WMD with the states of proliferation concern and to provide consent where necessary to the searching of vessels and aircraft that may be reasonably suspected of transporting WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
• The PSI has no organisational structures; it is based on the voluntary participation of countries in projects targeted to achieve as broad an inter-state co-operation as possible, and co-ordination between state institutions and institutions on a national scale.

http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism – GICNT

• The GICNT was announced in 2006 by the Presidents of the United States and Russia with the aim of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular, radioactive substances and nuclear materials.
• The initiative has 82 partner nations, including Latvia (since 2007). The partners work to ensure accounting, control and physical protection for nuclear materials and radioactive substances, enhance security of nuclear programmes and civilian nuclear facilities, prevent illicit transporting of, and trafficking in such materials, improve capabilities of participants for response to acts of nuclear terrorism, enhance legal frameworks and cooperation among law enforcement institutions to provide for the implementation of appropriate criminal liability for such offense, as well as to promote information sharing among the states.

Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation – HCOC

• The Code of Conduct is a document of a global character that deals with the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The code was brought into effect in 2002. 131 countries, including Latvia, have subscribed to the HCOC.
• The HCOC aims to ensure a greater transparency with respect to missile development and testing programmes, including restraint to the proliferation of ballistic missile systems which could be capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The HCOC thus complements the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987.
• The Code of Conduct has no organisational structure; it works in the format of Regular Meetings (annual conferences) of Subscribing Sates and information sharing in the form of annual declarations.

Website of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: http://www.hcoc.at/

Important international treaties and agreements regulating control of conventional armament are also binding upon Latvia:

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects - CCWC

• Based on the principle of international law that the right of countries to choose means and methods of fighting are not unlimited, the Convention prohibits the use of such individual weapons during an armed conflict as may cause unnecessary and devastating injury to the fighting and civilian population. The Convention is an integral part of international law; it takes into account the defence requirements of countries and concern for the protection of civilians.
• The Convention is supplemented by five Protocols specifying in detail the types of weapons the use of which is restricted or prohibited by the Convention.
• Latvia has been a state party to the Convention since 1993 and has joined all the Protocols annexed to the CCWC. In 2010, Protocol V of the Convention took effect in Latvia that establishes a responsibility on the parties that have been engaged in an armed conflict to carry out the clearance, removal or destruction of unexploded remnants of war, as well as all the required measures for the protection of the civilian population, including marking, fencing and monitoring of territory affected by explosive remnants of war.
• Latvia supports the Action Plan for realising the universialisation of the Convention and calls on all States not party to the Convention to accede to the Convention and the Protocols annexed to it.
• By contributing to internationals efforts to end the harm caused by unrestricted use of cluster munitions, Latvia supports the on-going negotiations within the framework of the Convention on the development of a new protocol with the aim of achieving the prohibition of ineffective and inappropriate use of cluster munitions and avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties. The development of such a legal framework would be essential within the UN, given that the process involves countries having significant stockpiles of, producing and supporting this weapon as an effective part of modern ordnance.

Information on the Convention (including the texts of the CCWC and Protocols annexed to it):

http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument

The Ottawa Convention, or Convention on The Prohibition of The Use, Stockpiling, Production And Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

• In October 1996, an international conference was held in Canada, following which a declaration was adopted on co-operation between countries in drawing up a comprehensive agreement to ban the use of land mines. The year 1997 saw the adoption of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines, known as the "Ottawa Convention".
• The Ottawa Convention provides for a ban on the use, stockpiling and production of land mines. The Convention also prohibits assistance of any kind to other parties in undertaking activities prohibited by this Convention. Each State Party undertakes to ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines no later than 4 years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. The Convention does not prohibit remotely-operated mines.
• Due to their non-selective action, land mines are considered one of the most inhumane types of weapons in the world and, for this reason, most countries and international organisations actively oppose the use, production and proliferation of these weapons. Most often injured by land mines are not military personnel involved in military conflicts, but specifically members of the civilian population. In a number of regions of the world, unexploded land mines and the material loss they cause in addition to injury to civilian victims, has been one of the obstacles to the development of these regions in the post-war period.
• Latvia ratified the Ottawa Convention in 2005, and on 1 January 2006 became a full-fledged state party. Latvia has honoured its commitments under Article 4 of the Convention by destroying the land mines which were part of the National Armed Forces (NAF) ordnance. A small number of mines were retained for the training purposes of NAF units.

Text of the Ottawa Convention:

http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8DF9CC31A4CA8B32C12571C7002E3F3E/$file/APLC+English.pdf

OSCE Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

• The Vienna Document on "Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures" was adopted at the meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 16 November 1999. It is a politically binding agreement among the OSCE member states for strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space through measures for promoting mutual confidence.
• The agreement provides for an annual voluntary exchange of military information among the participating States and a mechanism for verifying information. The information obtained provides an overview on weapons, military forces and military activities. Inspecting can be performed in two ways – as an inspection, or an evaluation visit. The latter makes an assessment of the compliance of military parameters with the information provided by a respective participating State during an annual information exchange. Participating States are allocated their quotas of inspection and evaluation visits; bilateral agreements are however possible on additional quotas.
• The OSCE Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on 1-2 December 2010, adopted a declaration providing for the modernisation of conventional weapons control and confidence- and security-building regimes, including the VD99. Since the adoption of VD99 in 1999, the military environment has changed due to emerging asymmetrical threats and new technologies.

Text of the Vienna Document 1999 on Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (16 November 1999): http://www.osce.org/fsc/41276

Text of Astana Commemorative Declaration of the OSCE Summit Meeting (Astana, 2 December 2010): http://www.osce.org/mc/73962

Treaty on Open Skies - OST

• The Treaty, signed in 1992 among the then NATO and Treaty of Warsaw countries, took effect in 2002 and currently has 34 States Parties in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. The OST also came into force in Latvia on 1 January 2002.
• The Treaty establishes a programme for mutual observation and filming flights over the territories of States Parties, to acquire information on their armed forces, military sites and activities. The Treaty thus presents one of the armament control policy instruments aimed at promoting openness and trust.
• Under the OST, each State Party is obligated to receive one or more active quotas for observation flights over the territories of other States Parties. States Parties also receive passive quotas obliging them to host inspections by other States Parties, giving them the right to take part in transit flights and to follow whether those take place according to an agreed mission plan. Each State Party may conduct as many observation flights - its active quota - as its passive quota.
• Latvian armament control experts take part in OST flights, sharing flight quotas with other OST States Parties, and facilitate transit flights of other States Parties observation aircraft over the territory of Latvia under the Treaty.

Text of the Treaty on Open Skies (4 March 1992): http://www.osce.org/library/14127

Other international treaties, agreements and initiatives on conventional armament control:

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – CFE

• The Treaty was signed in 1990 (effective as of 1992) between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries with the aim of creating a safe and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe and keeping the armament at the lowest level possible. For this purpose the CFE sets number limits on five categories of conventional arms (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery pieces) and promotes building mutual trust through regular exchange of military information and conducting monitoring and inspections.
• After the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the CFE had to be substantially amended. During the OSCE Summit Meeting in Istanbul in 1999, the States Parties to the CFE signed the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE (ACFE), under which military blocs are replaced by national states as parties to the treaty. The ACFE has not come into force, because not all states parties, including the NATO member countries, have ratified it. (The reason for this is as follows: when signing the ACFE, the Russian Federation undertook to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova, i.e., the so-called Istanbul Commitments, whereas NATO countries agreed to ratify the ACFE only after the Istanbul Commitments have been met). In December 2007, Russia announced a unilateral moratorium on the fulfilment of its CFE obligations on the grounds that NATO member countries have failed to ratify the ACFE.
• States parties to CFE are determined to continue the modernisation process of the conventional arms control regime. Latvia believes that an efficient conventional arms control mechanism is necessary in Europe to promote trust and transparency among the countries.

Text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – CFE (19 November 1990): http://www.osce.org/library/14087

Text of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (19 November 1999): http://www.osce.org/library/14108

Conventional armament control within international organisations

• Latvia supports global efforts to restrict an uncontrolled transfer of conventional weapons that gives rise to violent conflicts, facilitates repressive regimes, the spread of crime and terrorism, the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. To address the problem, the UN is currently working on the drafting of the Arms Trade Treaty. The development of a treaty of this type targets establishing a set of common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.
• Latvia complies with UN, EU, OSCE and NATO initiatives towards the restriction of uncontrolled production, stockpiling and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Latvia presents regular reports to UN and OSCE on the measures carried out to prevent illegal transfer of arms and has transposed the relevant EU principles and provision into its domestic legislation.